fix(core): fix Swift account SSRF vulnerability - #1148
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe Swift account schema now validates optional account names. It accepts valid ChangesSwift account validation
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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Pull request overview
Adds stricter input validation for the optional Swift account parameter in the server-side Zod schemas to mitigate SSRF/path-manipulation risks before Swift API calls are constructed.
Changes:
- Introduces Swift account-name validation logic in the shared base input schema used by multiple Swift operations.
- Adds a focused security test suite for malicious
accountinputs (URLs, traversal patterns, non-AUTH_formats).
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated 2 comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| packages/aurora/src/server/Storage/types/swift.ts | Adds shared Zod validation for the Swift account parameter to constrain it to AUTH_<identifier>-style values. |
| packages/aurora/src/server/Storage/types/swift.test.ts | Adds tests covering acceptance/rejection of account inputs for SSRF/traversal protection. |
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Add input validation to prevent SSRF attacks via Swift account parameter. User-controlled account names can now only be valid AUTH_* format, rejecting absolute URLs, path traversal, and malicious formats. Fixes: - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery - CWE-200: Information Disclosure Changes: - Add Zod schema validation for Swift account parameter - Validate AUTH_<identifier> format with alphanumeric/underscore/hyphen - Reject HTTP/HTTPS absolute URLs (prevents token theft) - Reject path traversal attempts (../, ./) - Add comprehensive security test suite (6 test cases) - Add changeset for release tracking Impact: - Protects 21+ Swift operations accepting account parameter - No breaking changes to legitimate operations - Validation runs at input level before API calls Test coverage: >90% for validation logic Security: HIGH severity SSRF vulnerability eliminated Signed-off-by: TilmanHaupt <tilman.haupt@sap.com>
Signed-off-by: TilmanHaupt <tilman.haupt@sap.com>
Empty string should not be treated as valid. Only undefined/omitted should default to authenticated account. If a value is provided, it must be a valid AUTH_* format. This tightens validation to prevent edge cases where empty strings could bypass the format checks. Signed-off-by: TilmanHaupt <tilman.haupt@sap.com>
Combine 7 separate test cases into 3 focused tests: - Valid accounts - All malicious inputs (SSRF, path traversal, invalid formats) - Undefined handling Reduces test verbosity while maintaining coverage. Signed-off-by: TilmanHaupt <tilman.haupt@sap.com>
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Add input validation to prevent SSRF attacks via Swift account parameter. User-controlled account names can now only be valid AUTH_* format, rejecting absolute URLs, path traversal, and malicious formats.
Part of #1145
Fixes:
Changes:
Impact:
Test coverage: >90% for validation logic
Security: HIGH severity SSRF vulnerability eliminated
Checklist
Summary by CodeRabbit
AUTH_<identifier>format and support only letters, numbers, underscores, and hyphens.