┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ ██████╗ ██████╗ ██████╗ // ArtumosGOC │
│ ██╔════╝ ██╔═══██╗██╔════╝ // SYSTEM ARCHITECT │
│ ██║ ███╗██║ ██║██║ // HARDWARE + SECURITY │
│ ██║ ██║██║ ██║██║ // CIVIC TECH DEVELOPER │
│ ╚██████╔╝╚██████╔╝╚██████╗ // │
│ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ // Maringá, PR — BR │
│ │
│ [CPU: zsh] [KERNEL: linux] [SEC: tpm2.0] [STATUS: online] │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
; /proc/self — ArtumosGOC
; ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
ROLE: Civic Tech Developer / Hardware Hacker / Infra Engineer
OS: Linux (Debian-based) │ SHELL: zsh + oh-my-zsh
CURRENT_OBJ: TPM 2.0 + hardware-bound encrypted app research
FOCUS: Bare-metal C, embedded MCUs, container runtimes, YAML-driven civic web
TRUST_ANCHOR: Hardware ← "the only real root of trust"
PHILOSOPHY: Zero bloat. CDN-only. Lean stack. Auditable everything.
; ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┌───────────────────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────────┐
│ 🏙️ Maringá Participativa │ │ 🔐 TPM 2.0 Research │
│ ───────────────────────────── │ │ ───────────────────────────── │
│ Civic participation platform │ │ Hardware-bound crypto app dev │
│ HTML · CSS · Bootstrap 5 │ │ tpm2-tools · tss2 · C libs │
│ JS · YAML · js-yaml │ │ Studying: sealing, PCR, NVRAM │
│ Deployed via GitHub Pages │ │ Target: tamper-evident storage │
└───────────────────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────────┐
│ 🖥️ web-terminal │ │ 📰 boletim-diario-segurança │
│ ───────────────────────────── │ │ ───────────────────────────── │
│ Per-session container runtime │ │ Daily infosec bulletin bot │
│ Docker · Podman (rootless) │ │ GitHub Actions · Python 3 │
│ VFS storage driver │ │ BeautifulSoup · lxml │
│ Bypass overlayfs + iptables │ │ Auto-scrape → Markdown report │
└───────────────────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────────┐
│ 🔡 bitmap-font / bare-metal │ │ 🛠️ EditorYml (Desktop App) │
│ ───────────────────────────── │ │ ───────────────────────────── │
│ 8×8 ASCII font — C header │ │ PySide6 / QML YAML editor │
│ 96-char table, uint8_t[96][8] │ │ Generates site HTML + YAML │
│ AVR · ESP32 · STM32 │ │ Google Drive attachment sync │
│ No OS. No libs. Pure registers. │ │ Image carousel support │
└───────────────────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────────────┘
LAYER 0 — HARDWARE & EMBEDDED
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
C (bare-metal) ████████████░░ AVR / ESP32 / STM32
Assembly (AVR) ████████░░░░░░ Register-level
TPM 2.0 (tss2) ██████░░░░░░░░ Learning / Research
Web Serial API ███████░░░░░░░ Browser ↔ Arduino
Bitmap fonts █████████░░░░░ uint8_t pixel arrays
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
LAYER 1 — INFRA & CONTAINERS
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Docker / Podman ████████████░░ Rootless, VFS, nested
Nginx ████████████░░ Reverse proxy, auth
GitHub Actions █████████████░ CI/CD, automation
Cloudflare ███████████░░░ Tunnel, DNS, OAuth PKCE
Linux (Debian) █████████████░ Daily driver
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
LAYER 2 — SOFTWARE
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Python 3 █████████████░ Scripts, GH Actions, PySide6
Bash / Zsh ████████████░░ Automation, DevOps
HTML/CSS/JS ████████████░░ Vanilla, Bootstrap 5
YAML / js-yaml █████████████░ Site content engine
PySide6 / QML ████████░░░░░░ Desktop app dev
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
hardware_security:
- TPM 2.0: sealing blobs, PCR attestation, NVRAM storage
- Secure boot chain analysis
- Hardware root-of-trust concepts
infra_security:
- Container runtime isolation (seccomp, AppArmor, namespaces)
- Rootless container privilege model
- OAuth 2.0 + PKCE flows, token lifecycle
low_level:
- Kernel restrictions in nested container environments
- clone() CLONE_NEWUSER syscall restrictions
- VFS vs overlayfs storage driver security model
recon_interest:
- Network exposure via Cloudflare Tunnel (zero-trust model)
- Daily infosec bulletin monitoring (Codaqui org)
- Browser-based runtimes (Pyodide, Web Serial API)
/* principles.h */
#define DEPENDENCY_POLICY ZERO_UNLESS_JUSTIFIED
#define TRUST_BOUNDARY HARDWARE_ONLY
#define DEPLOYMENT_TARGET CDN_OR_STATIC
#define CODE_STYLE AUDITABLE_AND_LEAN
#define OPEN_SOURCE_STANCE IF_IT_TOUCHES_PUBLIC_DATA_IT_SHIPS_OPEN
typedef enum {
PRIORITY_CIVIC_IMPACT,
PRIORITY_SECURITY,
PRIORITY_REPRODUCIBILITY,
PRIORITY_PERFORMANCE,
} BuildPriority;╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ [ SESSION CLOSED ] [ MEMORY WIPED ] [ TPM SEALED ] ║
╚═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
"The hardware doesn't lie. The software might."